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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Long-range Planning for National Intelligence Production

1. In my capacity as your intelligence adviser I have become increasingly concerned with the problem of narrowing the gap between your intelligence production requirements and the actual intelligence produced by the machinery subject to my coordination.

2. It appears to me that the flow of production requirements from national intelligence consumer to national intelligence producer has not been adequately systematized, and that this flow consequently tends to be characterized by irregularity and short-term emergency requirements. Under such circumstances the producer, while able to engage in spot reporting and estimating with full confidence in its pertinence to national security problems, is left largely to his own resources in appraising the long-range national requirements for his intelligence product. As a result his efforts in the latter respect are in danger of being one-sided, or even wasteful.

3. In view of this situation, I am directing my agency to make careful studies of policy papers, intelligence requests, and intelligence reports, and to derive, for each major area of the world as well as for selected functional fields, a concise concept of the principal considerations and objectives which, from the standpoint of United States security, should govern the planning and production of national intelligence. As each of these intelligence concepts is completed, I intend to submit it to you with a request for verification of its applicability to national security problems and objectives.

4. Subsequent to your approval or modification of a series of such intelligence concepts, it is my intention to present them in succession to the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a basis for evolving integrated plans of national intelligence production, designed to meet the considerations and objectives set forth in the concepts. At subsequent intervals the concepts will be reviewed to insure their continued applicability in the light of new events.

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5. The development of integrated national intelligence production plans, based on concepts approved by you, is in my consideration the key to coordination of intelligence production, which in turn is the basis of coordination for all other foreign intelligence activities throughout the governmental structure. While it is recognized that the procedure I suggest will not eliminate the occurrence of unpredictable intelligence production requirements, it will provide the high-level, long-range guidance prerequisite to adequate national intelligence planning, and will furnish standards for judging the validity of intelligence requests not directly related to stated National Security Council requirements.

6. Attached hereto at Tab A for your consideration is a concept of national intelligence production on the Far East in the form of a staff study.

7. There is also included at Tab B a proposed intelligence production plan designed to meet the intelligence objectives contained in the concept. This enclosure, which is still undergoing analysis and revision by Central Intelligence Agency, is submitted merely in amplification of the concept, and not necessarily for National Security Council review and comment, since it has not been discussed within the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and will not be discussed therein until your comments upon the concept have been received.

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosures: (2)
Tabs A and B

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STAFF STUDY

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THE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether definitive guidance to the Central Intelligence Agency from the national planning and policy level of the United States Government should be obtained for the purpose of enabling The Director of Central Intelligence, in conjunction with the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, to devise integrated national intelligence production plans, in fulfillment of his responsibility for coordinating the national intelligence effort; and if so, what procedure should be adopted for obtaining such guidance.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. a. The value of national intelligence is directly proportional to its pertinence to national security problems and objectives.

b. The relative degree of pertinence of various categories and types of intelligence to such national security problems and objectives can be assessed adequately by only two groups of individuals:

(1) The national security planners, or consumers of national intelligence, by virtue of their familiarity with long and short-range requirements.

(2) The national intelligence producers, by virtue of their continuous study of information and developments.

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c. It is therefore evident that the timeliness and applicability of national intelligence depends upon sustained coordination between its consumers and producers.

d. The flow of intelligence production requirements from consumer to producer has not been systematized, and consequently tends to be characterized by irregularity and short-term emergency requirements. Under such circumstances the producer, while able to engage in spot reporting and estimating with full confidence in its pertinence, is left largely to his own resources in imagining the long-range requirements of his intelligence product. As a result his efforts in the latter respect are in danger of being one-sided, or even wasteful.

e. It may be contended that the National Intelligence Objectives (DCI 4/1), issued in conformance with National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, furnish adequate guidance for the planning of intelligence production. This contention is believed erroneous for the following reasons:

(1) The National Intelligence Objectives, although serving as an ideal frame of reference, are in effect a synopsis of all information desired by the United States Government, and are consequently of little value for guiding a finite intelligence effort.

(2) The National Intelligence Objectives can in no sense be interpreted as sustained coordination between the consumers and producers of national intelligence.

(3) No matter how carefully the National Intelligence Objectives may be designed or revised, they can have little reality until based upon National Security Objectives, which have yet to be produced at the national planning level.

f. In view of the nature of the National Intelligence Objectives, and in the absence of systematized guidance from the planning echelon of government, the national intelligence production and coordination machinery follows in the wake of national planning, instead of constituting a basis for its formulation.

g. Because of heavy and time-consuming responsibilities, it cannot be presumed that the National Security Council will in the near future institute a procedure for systematic guidance to intelligence producers. Nevertheless, the importance of such a procedure to the security interests of the government is so apparent that the National Security Council can hardly refuse consideration of reasonable proposals from a responsible official such as the Director of Central Intelligence.

h. With this thought in mind, the Office of Reports and Estimates has developed an approach for stimulating guidance from intelligence consumer to intelligence producer in such

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manner as to make the consumer's contribution relatively easy and acceptable. The approach would be based on a careful study by the Office of Reports and Estimates of policy papers, intelligence reports, and intelligence requests pertaining to a selected region or field of interest. From this study would be derived a concise intelligence concept, which may be defined as an expression of the principal considerations which, from the standpoint of United States security, should govern the planning and production of national intelligence on any given area of the world. This concept would then be presented to the National Security Council for verification of its applicability to national security problems and objectives. Following its approval or modification by the National Security Council, the concept would be used as a basis for developing a comprehensive plan of intelligence production designed to meet the considerations and objectives set forth in the concept. At subsequent intervals, the concept would be reviewed to insure its continued applicability in the light of new developments.

i. The derivation and submission of concepts, as well as the development of implementing plans, should be examined in relation to the following principal functions of the Director of Central Intelligence:

- (1) Chief Intelligence Officer and Adviser to the National Security Council.
- (2) Coordinator of the National Intelligence effort.

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In his first capacity, it is assumed that the Director of Central Intelligence can, without prior consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, approach the National Security Council on any intelligence matter which does not involve commitments, responsibilities, or prerogatives of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Conversely, the Director of Central Intelligence, in his second capacity, is required by National Security Council Intelligence Directives to obtain Intelligence Advisory Committee comment on proposals directly affecting the activities of its members.

j. It is believed that the Office of Reports and Estimates approach mentioned in paragraph h above not only supports the two principal functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, but also serves to clarify the fundamental distinction between those functions, as follows:

(1) An intelligence concept, upon which an intelligence production plan can be based, is an ideal expression of intelligence goals or objectives, unencumbered by the limitations of actual collection or production facilities. It is the step which must logically precede intelligence planning, and should therefore be verified by the National Security Council before presentation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a basis for planning. Such a procedure would permit the Director of Central Intelligence to function initially as an adviser by presenting concepts to

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the National Security Council, and subsequently as a coordinator by presenting approved intelligence goals to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for planning action.

(2) If, however, the Director of Central Intelligence were to negotiate intelligence concepts with the Intelligence Advisory Committee before presenting them to the National Security Council, it is believed that he would be abrogating the role of principal intelligence adviser to the National Security Council, and would be engaging the efforts of the Intelligence Advisory Committee in directions which might prove erroneous after consideration by the National Security Council.

CONCLUSIONS

3. That sustained coordination between the consumers and producers of national intelligence should be established as an activity bearing directly upon the national security.

4. That the National Intelligence Objectives, because of their sweeping inclusiveness and remoteness from concrete security problems, are unsuitable for providing sustained guidance or coordination.

5. That the Director of Central Intelligence, as intelligence adviser to the National Security Council and as coordinator of the national intelligence effort, is required to recommend methods for sustaining coordination between the consumers and producers of national intelligence.

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6. That coordination can most readily be achieved by submitting periodically for approval or modification by the National Security Council, concepts of intelligence production for each major area of the world.

7. That integrated national intelligence production plans should be developed by the Central Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, based upon the intelligence concepts approved by the National Security Council.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. That the Director of Central Intelligence approve the foregoing conclusions.

9. That, if approved, the conclusions be initially implemented by forwarding the attached memorandum with enclosures to the National Security Council.

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TAB

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COPY NO. 7

STAFF STUDY

A Concept of National Intelligence Production
on the Far East

1 December 1949

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THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the principal considerations which, from the standpoint of United States security, should govern the planning and production of national intelligence on the Far East.

DISCUSSION

2. a. Assumptions

For the purpose of this discussion it is assumed:

(1) That United States security objectives and interests in the Far East are largely influenced by a world-wide struggle for power with the USSR.

(2) That, unless a basis for mutual accommodation is found, this struggle for power will result in:

(a) Armed conflict of major proportions; or,

(b) The gradual accumulation and exercise by one protagonist, on terms short of war, of elements of power, including limited armed force, which eventually nullify the other's will and capacity to resist.

b. Significance of the Far East

The Far East is a region of large material and human resources possibly capable of being controlled and organized by an unfriendly power in such manner as to pose a crucial threat to the security of the United States. This possibility was recognized by Japan and planned in terms of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is probable that Czarist

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illiterate and unsophisticated populations, subject to deprivation and uncertainty, and desirous of improving their conditions. There is, moreover, the particular susceptibility of those abler individuals who, released by the weakening of customary social mechanisms, seek expression, status, and power, and frequently identify their aims with nationalistic or progressive goals. Taking full advantage of these circumstances is a vigorous international communism admittedly devoted to

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acquiring domination of the Far East as part of its objective of world domination. The dynamic nature of communism, its ability to exploit professedly nationalist movements, the constantly shrinking portions of the Far East not under its power, and the difficulty of retrieving, by Western democratic methods, any area once lost to it, all indicate the importance of estimating the remaining prospects for increasing or lessening control in the Far East by either side in the US/USSR struggle.

d. Potentials of the Far East

An assessment of the human and material potentials of the Far East is of continuing moment to whomever may hope to achieve a position of influence or control over all or parts of that region. On the basis of an enduring world struggle between the United States and the USSR, on terms short of war, the respective contenders must recognize and strive to control, within whatever limitations their principles impose, those elements of human and material power in the Far East which will ultimately help to weigh a world balance in their favor. Since, however, the threat of war always exists, it is more urgent to take immediate and continuing stock of existing potentialities for war of all or parts of the Far East. Of particular importance to United States security in this respect is the question of

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the growth in the Far East of a comprehensive war-making complex independent from, but in support of other centers of Soviet power.

CONCLUSIONS

3. That the principal considerations which, from the standpoint of United States security, should govern the planning and production of national intelligence on the Far East are as follows:

a. Possibilities for control in the Far East, to include:

(1) Vulnerability of the Far East, area by area, to control unfavorable to the United States.

(2) Capabilities for the acquisition, exercise, and denial of control in the Far East by parties to the US/USSR struggle.

b. Potentialities of the Far East in War and Peace, including:

(1) The possibility of the formation of a comprehensive war-making complex in the Far East, independent from, but in support of other centers of Soviet power.

(2) The existence or emergence in the Far East of elements of power employable by the major contenders in a protracted world struggle on terms less than war.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. That the National Security Council approve the foregoing conclusions, or indicate necessary modifications.

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5. That the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to use such approved or modified conclusions as the basis for developing, in collaboration with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, a comprehensive plan for national intelligence production on the Far East.

NOTE: The attached map portrays in white the Far East as the term is used in this study.

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